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 The purpose of this paper is to assess the numer-
ous issues of marginalization, discrimination, and health 
disparities experienced by transgender individuals in U.S. 
culture. These experiences include those fostered by the 
cisgender heterosexual majority as well as the LGBT com-
munity. Legal issues, biological essentialism, and social 
inequality will be addressed, with a focus on transgender 
women as at high risk for hate crimes. Intersectionality 
is frequently addressed due to the multitude of identities 
transgender men and women occupy at a single time and 
throughout their lifespan (Gutierrez, 2004). 
 While the terms “sex” and “gender” are considered 
common nomenclature in U.S. discourse, their conceptu-
alizations are susceptible to various subjective definitions 
according to use. From a scientific perspective, sex is 
reflective of biological disposition while gender is influ-
enced by psychological state as well as social and cultural 
location. According to Yarber and Sayad (2013) sex refers 
to “whether one is biologically female or male, based on 
genetic and anatomical sex.” (p. 8). In addition, sex in-
cludes genetic factors such as chromosomal arrangement 
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and hormonal levels as well as anatomical genital repre-
sentation (Yarber & Sayad, 2013). In the U.S., anatomical 
sex is commonly used to assign gender at birth (Brill & 
Pepper, 2008). Two critical concepts within gender in-
clude gender identity and expression, each of which plays 
a significant role psychological, emotional, and social 
development of the individual (Brill & Pepper, 2008). 
Gender identity “refers to a person’s internalized, deeply 
felt sense of being male, female, both, or neither. […] Be-
cause gender identity is internal and personally defined, it 
is not visible to others” (Brill & Pepper, 2008, p.4). Gen-
der identity is therefore the part of gender that is up to 
the individual to determine; it can vary greatly from one’s 
gender assigned at birth. It is not uncommon, however, 
for gender identity to align itself with the biological sex. A 
person is considered to be cisgender if they identify with 
the sex they were assigned at birth. For example, some-
one with the designation F on their birth certificate who 
identifies as female would be categorized as a cisgender 
woman (Serano, 2007).
 Gender expression “is how we externalize our gen-
der” (Brill & Pepper, 2008, p.4). This includes the aspects 
of gender that are visible to the naked eye, ranging from 
the clothes worn and the mannerisms of an individual. 
Gender expression can be considered a tangible extension 
of the intangible gender identity. The word “transgender” 
refers to anyone who does not identify with the sex they 
were assigned at birth (Brill & Pepper, 2008). However, 
just because someone has an atypical gender expression 
does not mean they are transgender; here, it is up to the 
individual to self-identify. There are a multitude of terms 
to describe all nonconforming people in the Western 
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world; there is also evidence of similar people in other 
non-Western cultures, though they would not necessarily 
be called transgender. 
 Transgender people are not the only ones who are 
marginalized because of conflicting identities—the lives 
of intersex people are similarly stigmatized. The word 
intersex covers a broad range of conditions, but can sim-
ply be defined as “when an individual’s body present 
ambiguities, anomalies or inconsistencies in the biologi-
cal components of his or her sexual identity, i.e. in his or 
her sex chromosomal, hormonal, and/or morphological 
sex” (Fraser & Lima, 2012, p.358).  It has been estimated 
that one to two children per one hundred births have an 
intersex condition, and it has been estimated that nearly 
13% of the world population is transgender (Preves, 2009; 
Witten & Eyler, 1999). 
Essentialism and Social Constructionism Theory
 The theory of biological essentialism (or just es-
sentialism) suggests one’s anatomic and genetic sex play 
a role in determining the gender of the individual (John-
son, 2005). Essentialism embraces a hard determinist 
perspective, where sex and gender are conflated as being 
one and the same (Gilden, 2008). While biology itself is 
not problematic, it has become an issue surrounding the 
rights of both trans men and women (and non-binary 
trans people) with regard to their birth assignment. The 
assigned sex of transgender people (their birth sex) is 
viewed as more natural, more real, than the gender they 
identify as, and the problems lies here. The problem is the 
focus on the birth sex and anatomy of the trans woman 
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as a means of preventing her from living life as a wom-
an. These views contribute to cissexism, which Serano 
defines as “the belief that transsexuals’ identified genders 
are inferior to, or less authentic than, those of cissexuals 
(i.e., people who are not transsexual and who have only 
ever experienced their subconscious and physical sexes as 
being aligned)” (2007, p.13). 
 Social constructionism theory seeks to explain how 
reality is defined by human beings, and how what may 
be true in one culture or time period can be drastically 
different in another (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). This 
creation of reality takes place in several stages in the cul-
ture at large as well as in the individual. The law is a major 
factor in determining which behaviors and genders are 
normalized, sometimes with the name of science to back 
up such claims (Ussher, 1997). However, a body cannot be 
abnormal unless there is category defined as normal; bod-
ies that fall along a continuum, like intersex and transgen-
der people, are really only abnormal because they fall out 
of what is socially agreed upon as normal (Preves, 2009). 
The realm of biology, even for human beings, allows for 
unlimited variation; it is only through our minds that this 
science becomes limited.
 In regards to intersex people, those born with 
ambiguous genitalia are often quickly operated on to 
ensure that they are categorized as either male or female. 
In this way, the sex categories of man and woman are 
kept mutually exclusive, and the threat to the binary is 
allegedly fixed (Fausto-Sterling, 2000; Preves, 2009). If 
such variance is able to consistently reproduce itself time 
and again, then it cannot truly be “abnormal” or “unnatu-
ral.” The socially constructed views of what is appropriate, 
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normal, or natural may result in the marginalization of 
individuals whose sexual identities are seen as inappro-
priate, problematic, or less genuine.  
 Transgender people, as do intersex people, often 
find themselves with limited options in life. The Diagnos-
tic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV “catego-
rizes [Gender Identity Disorder, GID] as a psychological 
disorder” and forms the basis for medical provider’s treat-
ment of transgender people (Greenberg, 2011, p.209). 
The diagnostic criteria state that the desire to become the 
opposite sex must  “cause clinically significant distress or 
impairment in social, occupational, or other important 
areas of functioning” (American Psychiatric Association, 
1994, p.581). The approach to transition is typically three-
pronged, with requirements of real-life experience in the 
desired gender role, hormone therapy, and sex reassign-
ment surgery (Johnson, 2010). Essentially the choices that 
transgender individuals have to make are constrained to 
the gender binary (West & Zimmerman, 1991). 
 If GID were a mental disorder, by default the trans-
gender person would be in distress. If this were the case, 
they would not be mentally competent enough to consent 
to surgery or the hormonal replacement that commonly 
accompany gender transition. Yet a lack of mental distress 
could mean a withholding of surgery or hormones, so 
the choices for the trans individual are limited (Johnson, 
2010). However dysphoric individual trans people may 
feel towards their bodies, claiming the label of transgen-
der can be a positive experience and therefore not be a 
cause for the aforementioned distress (Riggle et al., 2011). 
There is also a concern that children may be referred to 
clinics for evaluation, not because of their own distress, 
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but because of a parent or guardian’s concern at their 
cross-gender behavior (McQueen, 2008). Some people 
will not fit the criteria for GID and will therefore have no 
access to medical resources; relying upon medical diag-
nosis, therefore, has major limitations (Bornstein, 1994; 
Herman 2012).  
 Medical standards for transsexualism also reinforce 
essentialism and cissexism, as many transgender people 
are required to behave in a stereotypical gender fash-
ion that serves to reiterate the gender binary (Johnson, 
2010, 156; Wentling, 2009). Even if a person is diagnosed 
with GID and is able to receive the treatments they need, 
they may still be denied significant legal protections. 
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) audited Rhiannon 
O’Donnabhain in 2006 for the medical procedures she 
underwent as a transgender woman. They “maintained 
that O’Donnabhain’s sex reassignment treatment was 
elective and cosmetic and thus not eligible for medical 
reduction,” but the court ruled in her favor for the most 
part (Herman 2012, p.491). However, while they cit-
ed O’Donnabhain’s various treatments as cosmetic and 
unnecessary, the IRS has “permitted medical deductions 
for facelifts, hair transplants, and hair removal” (Herman, 
2012, p.498). According to this, surgery to change one’s 
body for vanity purposes is perfectly fine, but those done 
to alleviate gender dysphoria are unnecessary. In addition, 
anti-discrimination laws extend only to sexual orienta-
tion; unless otherwise stated, they exclude gender identity 
(Johnson, 2010).
 Behaving in a heteronormative (even cisnormative) 
manner can have very different consequences for trans 
men and women, as heterosexuality does not create a 
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sexual norm alone (Solis, 2007). Femininity or feminine 
behaviors in people assigned male at birth have frequently 
been targeted as being at-risk for homosexuality (Burke, 
1996; Pascoe, 2005; Serano, 2007). Femininity in cisgen-
der women has frequently been used to discredit their 
intelligence. For trans women there is again a double 
standard; if she acts feminine, she is a caricature, a par-
ody of true womanhood; if she acts masculine, then it is 
her “true” nature (her maleness) revealing itself (Serano, 
2007; West & Zimmerman, 1991). Masculinity, then, is 
privileged over femininity in that sense, for if men and 
women are opposites, then so must masculinity and 
femininity; and if they are opposites, one must repre-
sent strength, power, authenticity, and the other must be 
weakness, fragility, and artificial (Fausto-Sterling, 2000; 
Serano, 2007; West & Zimmerman, 1991).
Male Privilege and Trans Men
 In a study on gender in the workplace, Schilt (2006) 
documented the experience of twenty-nine transgen-
der men, whom she divides groups of “open FTMs” and 
“stealth FTMs.” The former included trans men who tran-
sitioned openly and remained in the same job; the latter 
included trans men who transitioned in secret, and have 
since gotten jobs as men, with no hints to their transgen-
der status. Schilt found that in both the blue collar and 
professional jobs, trans men felt that their experiences 
prior to transition greatly shifted once they transitioned 
and worked as men (Schilt, 2006). Several, if not all, of the 
interviewees could cite specific instances where, had they 
still been female-identified, they would have faced dis-
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crimination (Schilt, 2006). Several of them also reported 
a major drop in sexual harassment, especially those who 
were stealth. 
 In studies regarding trans men and sex work, trans-
gender men reported sex work within the past year at a 
rate of 18.8% out of 16 participants, a rate much lower 
than studies that focus on transgender women involved 
with sex work (which have reported rates as high as 67%) 
(Brennan et al., 2012; Reisner et al., 2010) However, open 
trans men were often asked invasive questions about their 
sex life and genitals. Many trans men in Schilt’s study 
reported having opportunities opened to them as a result 
of transitioning, as opposed to remaining gender noncon-
forming. Wayne reported that, before his legal and med-
ical transition, a previous employer would not allow him 
to work at the front because “when I would put the uni-
form on, she would say, ‘That makes you look like a guy’” 
(Schilt, 2006, p.396). Wayne’s boss would not allow him 
to the front for fear that customers would no longer come 
to the business. Since transitioning, Wayne has not en-
countered that issue. He believes, with good reason, that 
remaining gender ambiguous would have lost him many 
economic opportunities. Other studies report that trans 
men fear losing their jobs if they come out, and that trans 
men often experience slight pay increases after transition-
ing (Dietert & Dentice, 2010). This is in direct contrast 
with studies on trans women, who experience “significant 
decrease in pay and status” (Dietert & Dentice, 2010, 
p.126).
 Male privilege is something that extends to all 
men, but in different ways (Johnson, 2005). A white man 
experiences male privilege in a way very different from a 
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man of color. Race and ethnicity negatively affected many 
of the men in the previously mentioned study after their 
transition (Schilt, 2006, p.399). Keith, the man mentioned 
in the previous paragraph, felt that he had to be more 
careful in expressing his anger because of his race. “I went 
from being an obnoxious Black woman to a scary Black 
man,” he said, feeling that his anger is viewed as more 
threatening by white people (Schilt, 2006, p.399). Anoth-
er black trans man, Aaron, described how his employers 
constantly remark at how “threatening” and “aggressive” 
he is (Schilt, 2006). The racist imagery of black men often 
portrays them as “wild beasts, criminals, and rapists,” so 
it should not be surprising that such would be extended 
to the black trans man as well as the black cisgender man 
(Collins, 2004).
 Christopher, an Asian trans man, felt that he was 
viewed as less of a man by coworkers due to his race, as 
passivity is a stereotype of Asian men. “People have this 
impression that Asian guys aren’t macho and therefore 
aren’t really male. Or they are not as male as [a white 
guy],” he remarked (Schilt, 2006, p.399). The sexuality of 
Asian people has long been held up as hermaphroditic 
when compared to white sexuality, as have Asian genders 
(Lee, 1999). Racist notions are indeed gendered notions, 
as racist stereotypes differ by the gender of the individual 
and are often upheld by heterosexist notions of gender 
(Collins, 2004; Lee, 1999; Somerville 1994). When male 
privilege is mentioned alongside transgender men, this is 
meant to call attention to how masculinity and maleness 
are favored over femininity and femaleness. This does not 
mean that all transgender men have the same experiences 
or even an easier experience, however. 
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 Ariel Levy harshly criticized transgender people 
assigned female at birth in her book Female Chauvinist 
Pigs, claiming that nonbinary people (who were assigned 
female at birth) who transition medically are women who 
just want male privilege; she asks why anyone would need 
hormones and surgery “if gender is supposed to be so 
fluid in the first place” (Levy, 2005, p.127). But recall that 
medicalized transition is not easy to obtain, especially 
not for nonbinary individuals, because of how rigid the 
World Professional Association for Transgender Health 
(WPATH) standards are, a fact that Levy never points out 
or is aware of (Greenberg, 2011; Levy, 2005). Not surpris-
ingly, Levy did not deal with the issues of hypersexualiza-
tion of trans women (or women of color, for that matter). 
While trans men clearly are men and should be called out 
on their misogyny, this was about misgendering them and 
disrespecting their identities. 
 There is also the question of male privilege, and 
whether or not trans women have it. The fear is that trans 
women, having been socialized and raised with male 
privilege, will disrupt a woman’s space. This forms the 
basis for much discrimination of transgender women; 
for example, many all-female colleges will outright refuse 
to admit transgender students (Kraschel, 2012). Their 
reasoning is based off of Title IX. Universities feared that 
admitting trans women would somehow jeopardize feder-
al funding; despite a trans woman’s female identity, there 
was a essentialist slant to the counterarguments (Kraschel, 
2012). But Title IX can extend to protect transgender 
individuals, who are of a disadvantaged gender (Kraschel 
2012). In the case of Jennifer Miles, a transgender stu-
dent harassed by a professor, the courts ruled, “there is no 
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conceivable reason why such conduct should be reward-
ed with legal pardon just because […] plaintiff was not 
a biological female” (Kraschel, 2012, p.468). In addition, 
women’s only colleges have worked towards ending gen-
der discrimination and seek to empower their students. If 
openly transgender students were allowed into women’s 
colleges, these universities would challenge “the notion 
of a static gender dichotomy” and give aid to a “disadvan-
taged gender” (Kraschel, 2012). In short, allowing trans 
women into an all-women’s college would only strengthen 
and expand the message of women’s liberation. Whether 
or not trans men should be admitted is an entirely differ-
ent matter altogether.
Crimes Against Trans Women of Color
 Those who commit crimes against transgender 
people, especially against trans women, will often cite 
trans panic as part of their defense (Greenberg, 2011). In 
the murder of Angie Zapata, an eighteen-year-old trans 
woman, the defendant Allen Andrade claimed that Angie 
had deceived him about her real gender, and this decep-
tion caused him to lose control upon learning the truth 
(Tilleman, 2010). There have been similar cases in the 
past where murders of gay men were justified using the 
gay panic defense (Tilleman, 2010). The trans panic de-
fense asserts that the victim, by way of not immediately 
revealing their transgender status, somehow provokes a 
violent attack from an otherwise “reasonable man” (Tille-
man, 2010). Yet there is no legal validity in claiming that a 
trans woman’s genitals, much less her existence, are suf-
ficient to allow murderers to walk free (Tilleman, 2010). 
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But hate crimes against trans women cannot be excused 
with the trans panic defense because the victim has done 
nothing wrong; what was done was not defense of one’s 
life, but reassertion of pride and wounded masculinity by 
eradicating the transgender individual (Kidd & Witten, 
2008; Tilleman, 2010). The idea is that the very existence 
of the transgender person (especially the transgender 
woman) can enrage a cisgender person into a violent at-
tack; it mirrors a similar argument that women can entice 
male perpetrators to rape for merely walking down the 
street (Kidd &Witten, 2008; Tilleman, 2010).
 Such transmisogynistic notions are what make it 
difficult for a transgender woman to reach out for help; 
the perception of danger can translate to danger in reality 
for LGBT people (Robison, 2012). She may be geograph-
ically and emotionally isolated from her families for her 
transition; she may want to avoid strengthening their 
belief that “this is what she gets for being trans” (Green-
berg, 2011, p.216). The police may label trans women as 
sex workers, and because of this, there may be reluctance 
to involve the authorities. If they do call for help, they 
may be arrested along with their abuser. Trans women are 
often incarcerated “according to her assigned gender at 
birth” (Greenberg, 2011, p.234). Placement in a male fa-
cility puts trans women at high risk for rape, as in the case 
of Patti Shaw. Shaw “had undergone genital surgery and 
had identification that reflected her gender as female,” 
but was still placed in a cell with male prisoners, who 
harassed and raped her (Greenberg, 2011). Many states 
such as New York have laws that protect from discrimina-
tion based on sexual orientation, but not gender identity 
(Tilleman, 2010).
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 Domestic shelters for battered women and children 
are often varied in their treatment of transgender wom-
en. Many will not admit them, while others require proof 
of genital surgery or transition (Greenberg, 2011). This 
is problematic for two reasons: one, any type of genital 
surgery is expensive, and not every trans woman wishes 
to have her penis removed. Second, it places the needs 
of cisgender women above those of trans women. Some 
shelters “claim that if they were to admit trans women, 
the shelters could be faced with situations in which male 
abusers dress as women in order to access the facility,” 
but those shelters that do admit trans women have not 
reported such incidences (Greenberg, 2011, p.236). There 
have been cases of cisgender lesbian abusers acting as 
victims to enter a shelter, but none involving men dressed 
as women (Greenberg, 2011). The discomfort of the 
residents would not be a reason to deny any other kind 
of woman access—for example, a white woman’s desire 
to not be housed with a black woman wouldn’t be a good 
reason to discriminate for race. It would also not be fair to 
discriminate based on religion or sexual orientation.
 It is interesting to note this fear of male perpetra-
tors into women’s spaces is a common theme surround-
ing not only transgender issues, but (cisgender) womens’ 
rights as well. This issue has raised itself most notably in 
the field of female athletics, with sex testing occurring as 
early as 1912 (Fausto-Sterling, 2000). As with the domes-
tic violence shelters, there have been next to no incidenc-
es of male impersonators, save for one in 1936, though 
his maleness did not give him much of an advantage 
(Fausto-Sterling, 2000). Much of a person’s socialization 
will “exaggerate biological gender differences that already 
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exist” and causes those who stand out—the boys who are 
softer, the girls who are tougher—to hide or lessen their 
behaviors (Serano 2007, p.74).  It is possible that men are 
only stronger because they are perceived to be stronger, 
and this perception enforces the so-called essential truths 
about gender (West & Zimmerman, 1991).
 Much of the abuse of trans women is highly ra-
cialized, as “transgender women of color […] are at high 
risk for adverse health outcomes because of racial/ethnic 
minority status and gender identity, as well as for depres-
sion through exposure to transphobia” (Nemoto, 2011, 
1980). Many are at high risk for homelessness, with 43% 
in a study of 151 trans women having a history of home-
lessness and 67% engaged in sex work (Brennan et al., 
2012). More than half of them had the thought of com-
mitting suicide, and 61% actually attempted it (Nemoto, 
2011). The societal and individual discrimination towards 
trans women can “limit their employment opportunities 
and [change] the dynamics of safe sex negotiation with 
partners and increasing the risk of intimate partner vi-
olence” (Sanchez et al., 2010, p.352). Other studies have 
shown that transgender women are more likely to report 
exchange sex, higher rates of depression and social stigma 
compared to men who have sex with men, and unsta-
ble housing (Sanchez et al., 2009; Sevelius et al., 2009). 
Overall, 59.5% of transgender people report violence or 
harassment and 37.1% report economic discrimination 
(Kidd & Witten, 2008).
 Within the prison system, transgender women are 
subject to significant and blatant abuses of person. De-
spite their identification as female, they are often housed 
with cisgender men; well above half (59%) report being 
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the victim of sexual assault, compared to the rate of 4.4% 
within the general population (Anderson, 2011). Incar-
ceration of transgender women of color is quite common 
due to police profiling; many trans women are taken into 
custody for suspecting them of engaging in sex work, 
even if none was actually witnessed at the time (Ander-
son, 2011). The rates of incarceration for Latina and black 
women is higher than that of white women, with a black 
woman being 6.9 times more likely to be incarcerated in 
her life time, and a Latina woman 2.5 times more likely 
compared to a white woman (Crenshaw, 2012). Seeing 
as these rates are for cisgender women, it should not be 
surprising that the rates would be just as high, if not more 
so, for transgender women.
 It would be accurate to say that transgender wom-
en are often considered to be subhuman, or nonhuman. 
Courts have compared transgender women’s transitions 
as no better than “a person’s decision to be surgically 
transformed into a donkey,” have claimed that “to place 
a female name on a male is to combine incompatibles,” 
and have overall regarded transitioning, at least from the 
male-to-female perspective, as distasteful (Johnson, 2010, 
p.160). In childhood, people come to the realization that 
“one’s gender is not going to change: a man is a man even 
if he dresses like a woman” (Brill & Pepper, 2008, p.63). 
It is possible that this remains with people even in adult-
hood, and would explain at least part of why cissexism is 
so deeply ingrained in society, and the courts.
Feminism’s Failures
 Within the feminist movement, there is a focus on 
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birth assignment as the determining factor in how one 
faces oppression; this has been the justification for the 
inclusion of trans men and the exclusion of trans women 
(Hill-Meyer, 2012; Serano, 2007). Even the queer feminist 
reclamation of traditionally harmful forms of media, such 
as pornography, feature trans men and cisgender women 
more so than trans women (Hill-Meyer, 2012).
 There are places and events established by these 
feminists as “women-only” spaces (such as The Michigan 
Womyn’s Music Festival). The policy of this music festi-
val “is intended to exclude transsexual people, whether 
they are male-to-female transsexual (trans women) or 
female-to-male transsexuals (trans men)” (Koyama, 2002, 
p.5). However, there are performers that enter into this 
“womyn-only” space who openly identify as transgender; 
indeed, transgender people assigned female at birth are 
frequently allowed in as performers and festival attend-
ees, even if they identify as male (Koyama, 2002; Serano, 
2007). The reason given is that these people, being as-
signed female at birth, could never authentically exhibit 
maleness or masculinity, even if they should take on 
masculine identities or even transition (Serano, 2007).  It 
is important to remember that transgender women “face 
discrimination like cisgender women” and even more so 
because they are transgender (Kraschel, 2012, p.480).
 Janice Raymond is critic number one of transgen-
der women, having penned a book called The Transsexual 
Empire in 1979. She is especially hateful towards trans-
gender women who identify as lesbians and the cisgender 
lesbians who would validate their identity, calling such 
behavior a mutilation of reality (Raymond, 1994). But 
her criticism does not just target transgender women, but 
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also cisgender women who use birth control or have had 
hysterectomies: 
The various “breeds” of women that medical science 
can create are endless. There are the women who are 
hormonally hooked on continuous doses of estrogen 
replacement therapy. ERT supposedly will secure for 
them a new life of “eternal femininity. ” There are the 
hysterectomized women, purified of their “potentially 
lethal” organs for “prophylactic” purposes. Finally, 
there is the “she-male”—the male-to-constructed-fe-
male transsexual. And the offshoot of this “breed” is 
the transsexually constructed lesbian-feminist (Ray-
mond, 1994, p.35).
 It seems out of character that someone who identi-
fies as a feminist would find the use of birth control dis-
agreeable, considering how patriarchal structures dictate 
that women should have no control over how many 
children they have, or what they do with their bodies in 
general (Johnson, 2005; Ussher, 1997). The criticisms of 
the birth control movement as pushing forward white 
supremacy, the religious tenants that preach of the un-
cleanliness of a woman’s sex organs, and the pathologizing 
of homosexuality are all valid criticism of both feminism 
and the medical community (Collins, 2004; Somerville, 
1994; Ussher, 1997). But Raymond makes the statement 
that all of these medical procedures are bad and the med-
ical model serves to legitimize and uphold the so-called 
transsexual empire (Raymond, 1994). The idea of the les-
bian transsexual woman is, in her mind, a way for men to 
add themselves to the lesbian equation (Raymond, 1994). 
It is a common theme of heterosexism to project gen-
dered roles onto same-sex relationships, hence the ques-
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tion, “Which one’s the man and which one’s the woman?” 
(Wilton, 1996). Under patriarchy, it is assumed that all 
women want a good man, and that lesbians really want 
one too, but criticizing heterosexist structures, however, is 
not the issue at hand (Wilton 1996). Here she makes clear 
that her desire is to exclude trans women on the basis that 
they are not ‘real’ women.
 Radical feminism puts gender above all other 
forms of oppression—that is, that all women suffer alike 
under patriarchy regardless of other privileges or lack 
of privileges (Koyama, 2000). Assuming this to be true 
would mean that transgender women, by the circum-
stances of their birth, would have access to male privilege, 
making them more dangerous than if they had access to 
other privileges (white privilege, heterosexual privilege, 
etc) (Koyama, 2000). If trans women did have anything 
resembling male privilege, however, they would not be at 
such a high risk for rape, suicide, and other health dispar-
ities that also afflict cisgender women (Anderson, 2011; 
Brennan et al., 2012; Greenberg, 2011; Nemoto, 2011). 
Another flaw in this logic is that not all women suffer 
equally under patriarchy due to the multitude of privi-
leges and oppressions they have in their lives; to be silent 
about one for the sake of the other is to risk assimilation 
and further oppression (Johnson, 2005; Koyama, 2000). 
 While the previous passage from Raymond’s book 
may be extreme, she has done far more than make inflam-
matory remarks. In 1981, she authored a report that es-
sentially ended federal and state funding for transgender 
people in need, as well as caused insurance companies to 
place prohibitions on gender reassignment related claims 
(Roberts, 2007). The Human Rights Campaign has had a 
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similar outlook on transgender issues, with former execu-
tive director Elizabeth Birch having stated that transgen-
der issues would be a legislative priority “over her dead 
body” (Roberts, 2007). Though her term as executive 
director has long since ended, the HRC has continued to 
ignore and stall inclusion of transgender people (Roberts, 
2007).
Conclusion
 Transgender people, especially trans women, face 
multiple health disparities such as sexual assault, home-
lessness, lack of legal protections, and other pressing 
issues. Other factors such as race play into their oppres-
sion as well. Transgender people, especially women, will 
be able to have their rights fully recognized if all parts of 
their identities are not taken into account—their race, 
their class and education level, whether or not they have 
engaged in sex work, their sexual orientation, etc. All of 
these oppressions are connected; therefore they must all 
be eliminated. Some have suggested eliminating gender 
because of its socially constructed nature (Bornstein, 
1994, p.56—57), but this is detrimental. Gender is some-
thing that many trans people have had to fight for, and to 
take it away would be dishonoring that struggle. 
 There is no correct way to fight for trans rights, but 
the focus should surely be on the issues that trans women 
face. While all transgender people are pathologized and 
identity-policed, harmful medical standards prevent trans 
women from getting the care they need. Terms like au-
togynephilia and transvestitic fetishism were featured in 
the previous DSM and, if not widely talked about, are still 
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believed to be relevant to trans women; no such terms 
exist for trans men (Moser). The male-dominated medical 
community has always mistreated women, whether they 
are cisgender or transgender, and this must be eliminated. 
 Some topics were not explored as greatly in this 
work, such as employment discrimination, parental cus-
tody rights in cases where a parent or child is transgender, 
aging transgender people, and the history of the transgen-
der movement in the U.S. There are a number of issues 
that have yet to be fully delved into, but as stated prior, 
there is a lot of ground to cover when fighting for the 
rights of a marginalized group because there are so many 
at the axis of oppressions. There are very few people, aside 
from the most privileged, who do not experience multiple 
oppressions all at the same time, and ignoring even one 
can slow the movement towards freedom down.
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